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THE ETHICS OF SUBJECTING
A CHILD TO THE RISK OF ETERNAL TORMENT:
A REPLY TO SHAWN BAWULSKI
Kenneth Einar Himma

In “Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” I argue that it is morally wrong, given
ordinary moral intuitions about child-bearing decisions together with the traditional Christian doctrines of hell and salvific exclusivism, to bring a child
into the world when the probability that she will spend an eternal afterlife
suffering the torments of hell is as high as it would be if these two doctrines
are true. In a paper published by this journal, Shawn Bawulski responds to
my arguments, offering a number of philosophical and theological objections
to my arguments. In this essay, I reply to those objections and counter
arguments.

Introduction
Although it is typically thought that, as a general matter, it is morally
permissible for married couples to have children, I argue in “Birth as a
Grave Misfortune”1 that this view is mistaken if two traditional doctrines
of Christianity are true. The first of these views, Christian salvific exclusivism (CSE), holds that it is a necessary condition for being spared divine
punishment that one instantiate a genuinely saving Christian faith before
one’s death. The second is the traditional doctrine of hell (TDH), which
holds that (1) there are people consigned to hell; (2) hell is divine punishment of unforgiven sin; and (3) hell is a state of eternal torment unmatched
in severity by anything one can experience in this world.
My argument is grounded in a moral intuition I think most people
share, namely, that it is wrong for would-be parents to bring a child into
the world if they rationally believe there is a sufficiently high probability
that the child will experience severe harm after birth that will endure
throughout the child’s lifetime, which I call the New Life Principle (hereinafter NLP). Suppose, for example, 99 percent of the reliable evidence
available to would-be parents indicates that the child they contemplate
conceiving would be born with a terminal illness causing constant pain so
severe it cannot be alleviated by any known narcotics or even the comfort

Himma, “Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” 179–198.
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of her would-be parents’ love.2 It seems wrong for the would-be parents to
conceive at that point in time under these circumstances.
NLP seems to have some important implications with respect to whether
it is, as a general matter, permissible to bring a new child into the world.
Assuming TDH and CSE are true, the odds that any new child—bracketing
any information about the conditions into which she will be born—will
spend an eternal afterlife suffering the torments of hell are disturbingly
high. Indeed, only one-third of the world’s nearly seven billion people
claim to be Christians, effectively consigning the other two-thirds immediately to hell for eternity, under CSE. But the intuition underlying NLP
suggests it would also be wrong to bring a child into the world given the
risk that she will be consigned to hell for not having the right beliefs. Thus,
assuming TDH and CSE are true, it seems impermissible for would-be
parents to bring a child into the world when the odds she will experience
the torments of hell are as high as they would be if these two doctrines are
true. This, of course, is inconsistent with the view, shared by Christians
and non-Christians alike, that it is prima facie (or presumptively) permissible to bring a child into the world (hereinafter, the “Having Kids is Good
Principle” or HKG).3
It is important to be clear on what the conclusion is exactly. The conclusion is not that it is morally wrong to have children. Rather, insofar as
TDH, CSE, NLP, and HKG purport to be necessary truths (as truths about
God and ethics) the conclusion is that the set containing these claims is
logically inconsistent.4 The argument I gave, if sound, entails the rejection
of NLP, TDH, CSE, or HKG. Although one can reject any of these claims, I
think the most likely response discards CSE or TDH, and retains NLP and
HKG, since the underlying intuitions for these latter principles will likely
seem obvious and hence be held resolutely.
I. Objections and Replies: Theological Objections
Shawn Bawulski begins with a series of theologically grounded objections.5 His first objection challenges the intuitively grounded principle on
which the argument rests—namely, NLP. As Bawulski puts the objection:

2
This principle is intended to apply only to harms that are likely to persist throughout the
child’s lifetime. If a predicted harm can be treated and healed through medical science, then
the calculus—and relevant principle—changes.
3
HKG should be construed as being rebuttable. Apart from the exceptions I discuss in
this essay, I am agnostic with respect to what ordinary, earthly circumstances might rebut
the presumption. One might think the impact on the environment of bringing a child into
the world is relevant with respect to the application of HKG. I leave these matters to the
intuitions of the reader.
4
Assuming the relevant claims are contingent claims about this world, the fact that it is
true in this world that there is a grave risk of damnation is enough to show that the relevant
set of claims cannot all be true together.
5
Bawulski, “Do Hell and Exclusivism Make Procreation Morally Impermissible?,” 330–
344.
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Crucially lacking is any consideration for God’s activity; it seems that Himma’s concept of procreation is theologically impoverished. From Ps. 127:3—
children are a gift from the Lord, and he is the giver of life. Himma states this
initially in his essay, but it is strangely absent when he moves to discuss the
morality of the decision to procreate, leaving his essay liable to the impression that only human agency is relevant. The view taken up in this objection
says that God’s activity in procreation is paramount and is significant for the
procreation decision. I do not autonomously create a new person; rather,
God creates a new person in a way that involves my actions (reproduction).6

The claim here is that my analysis ignores a theologically grounded conception of procreation as involving both human and divine agency.
There are a couple of preliminary observations that should be made in
response to Bawulski’s remarks quoted above. First, although Bawulski
begins the objection with a citation to Biblical verses implying HKG, there
is no logical inconsistency between those claims and NLP, since NLP, by
its own terms, precludes bringing a child into the world only under certain
specified conditions. It might be true that bringing a child into the world
is a gift from God, but it does not follow that it is absolutely permissible for
two people to bring a child into the world. From the standpoint of ordinary intuitions, it can be permissible to decline a gift that is morally good
to offer. If, for example, Bill Gates kindly offers me a gift of $1,000,000, I
have a moral permission to respectfully decline the gift (perhaps I feel
uncomfortable accepting such a large sum of money). Intuitively, I do no
wrong by declining Gates’s gift, but Gates does no wrong by offering it.
Indeed, the idea that there is an absolute prohibition on declining gifts is
false on mainstream Christian views—even when the relevant gift is from
God! First, Christianity puts a constraint on the gift of procreation: it is
morally impermissible, according to mainstream Christianity, for unmarried people to procreate; the theology of Christianity pretty clearly implies
that the creation of a new child by God through the parents’ procreative
act is not necessarily a gift that is permissible to accept. This means, as
an interpretative matter, either children conceived out of wedlock are not
gifts from God or they are gifts that are permissible to decline. Either way,
there is no inconsistency between the claim that children are a gift from
God and NLP’s more general presupposition that bringing a child into the
world is wrong under certain specified conditions.
Second, it is reasonable to hypothesize that most Christians, including
more conservative Christians who accept TDH and CSE, would, and
with some validity, criticize two people who have children knowing they
cannot support them financially and emotionally—even if those children
are still plausibly regarded as “blessings” or “gifts.” It is both Biblical
and intuitive that having children comes with certain obligations of support. It simply seems wrong for would-be parents to bring a child into the
world when they know they cannot meet these support obligations. If this
Ibid., 336.

6
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is correct, then Bawulski hasn’t given any plausible reason to think that
NLP conflicts, in any way fatal to my argument, with the idea that having
children is a moral good or its implication, HKG.7
But Bawulski’s argument against NLP, despite citing a Biblical verse
indicating that children are a gift from God, does not really rely on that
claim, as far as I can see. The gravamen of Bawulski’s argument is, ultimately, that NLP is problematic because it implies the doctrine of salvific
universalism. Although there are Biblical verses supporting universalism,8
many Christians likely reject universalism on the strength of an intuition
that it is unfair to treat, under the guise of divine justice, those who repent
of their sins and follow the will of God in the same way as those who have
done neither.
The reason that Bawulski believes that NLP implies salvific universalism
is that he believes NLP must apply to God as well, since God’s agency is
also necessary to bring children into the world. For if NLP applies to God,
then it seems God is obligated not to bring any children into the world
that he knows will go to hell; this assumes, of course, that God knows both
which children would be brought into the world and how they would
act.9 If the doctrine of divine foreknowledge is true (and includes knowing
both who will be born and what choices they will make in life), then there
will be no one in hell, since God will abstain from bringing anyone into
the world who would wind up there. And this, of course, implies salvific
universalism.
Bawulski’s view that NLP must apply to God is vulnerable to objection—and one that, I believe, can be grounded in theologically informed
intuitions widely shared among ordinary Christians. One common response—at least among philosophical laypersons—to the theological
problem of evil, which, by its own terms, poses a problem internal to
Christianity requiring a reconciliation of suffering with mainstream
Christian theology, is simply to take the position that “God works in mysterious ways.” This can be interpreted in two ways equally plausible from
the standpoint of mainstream Christianity: (1) we are not in a position to
understand how moral principles apply to God; or (2) a different set of
moral principles from those applying to human beings apply to God.
7
It should be noted that the moral value of having children is distinct from the moral
value of a child’s life. The value of the latter would be regarded as intrinsic and sacred by
traditional views, whereas the value of having children might also be intrinsic, but is more
likely instrumental. In any event, HKG is concerned with the moral value of having children—i.e., under what circumstances having children is morally permissible. I am grateful
to an anonymous reviewer for making me aware of this concern.
8
For example, I. Corinthians 15:22 states, “As all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in
Christ.” Similarly, according to Romans 5:18, “God has imprisoned all in disobedience, that
He may be merciful to all.” Even more explicitly, I Timothy 2:4 teaches that “[i]t is the will of
God our Savior that all should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth.”
9
On an open theist view, God would presumably have sufficient empirical information
to make highly reliable predictions about both, falling short of knowledge, but consistently
accurate enough to justify not bringing doomed children into the world.
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Either way, Bawulski’s view that my argument presupposes that NLP
applies to God is problematic. There is nothing in my argument that suggests that the moral principles that apply to human beings necessarily
apply to God—even if we assume that Bawulski has provided sufficient
support for his views concerning God’s active role in procreation. I do not
have to take that position any more than Bawulski must as a Christian; I
could take the position, as many mainstream Christians do, that if God
exists, then a different set of moral principles govern his agency. Further,
if, as is generally assumed by mainstream Christians, human beings are
not in a sufficiently reliable epistemic position to assess God’s behavior
under moral standards, Bawulski cannot claim that NLP, even assuming
it applies to God, implies either salvific universalism or the claim that God
cannot bring into the world people he knows will go to hell.
Even so, Bawulski is correct in targeting NLP as the first line of attack,
as the argument clearly rests on an empirical prediction that the reader
will share my reaction to the possible fact-patterns I consider. In this connection, it is crucial to note that the claim that NLP expresses or conforms
to an ordinary intuition is an empirical claim that requires sociological
support of some kind; the claim that an intuition is “ordinary” simply
expresses the claim that most people share it.
Despite this fact, no empirical support was provided in the form of reliable sociological data—either by Bawulski or by me. Instead, I did what
is customary for philosophers in defending claims that a particular view
conforms to ordinary intuitions. I gave an argument contrived to elicit a
certain intuitive reaction from the reader:
There are a number of situations in which we may judge the act of bringing a new life in the world, or specifically, the procreative act itself, as being wrong. Consider, for starters, a couple who decides to conceive a child
knowing there is a high probability that the child will be born with a terrible
condition that will result in a short and terribly painful life—pain that is so
bad that the child cannot even be picked up without exacerbating it. Assume
also that this same couple would face a morally insignificant risk of giving
birth to a child with this condition if the couple simply delays conception
by a few years. Whether or not the child is born with the condition (but
especially if he or she is), it is quite plausible to think (and nearly everyone
I asked about this case took this position even while exhibiting sympathy
for the parents) the parents committed a moral wrong—and one against the
child—if they elected not to delay conception.10

If the reader rejects this argument because she has a different intuition
about the relevant moral issue presented by the case, then she will not
be persuaded by my argument. If, however, the reader shares my intuition that conceiving a child under those circumstances is wrong, then she
seems committed to some kind of principle that constrains the circumstances in which people can permissibly bring a new human life into the
10

“Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” 188–189.
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world. Further, that principle will clearly take into account the severity of
suffering to the child that will result if she is conceived and born.
Bawulski offers no serious challenge to my assumption that the
intuition underlying NLP is one shared by ordinary mainstream Christians—despite the fact that, at the end of the day, this is the element of the
argument most vulnerable to objection. He challenges NLP by claiming
it has certain implications that Christians should reject but, apart from
the fact that his reasoning is problematic, that does not, by itself, show
Christians would reject those implications, as they might have intuitions
different from those of Bawulski. What Bawulski does say about my claim
that readers will share certain intuitions is overly brief; he simply opines
that “Himma seems to regard NLP as representative of many if not most
people’s moral intuitions.”11 He questions what he incorrectly thinks are
implications of NLP but really never grapples with the cases that suggest
some principle like NLP is true.
Of course, it is up to the reader to decide whether she has the same reaction I do to the principal case on which I relied in BGM; however, I have
not relied on just this case in this reply. Earlier in this essay, I gave a couple
of other examples (and will give a few more below) in which I am, again,
hypothesizing or predicting that the reader will share my reaction to at
least one of them. These cases had to do with would-be parents who are
not married bringing children into the world and with would-be parents
bringing children into the world they know they cannot support—either
financially or emotionally.
It is true, of course, that only one of these challenges is directly relevant.
The first challenge to HKG was grounded in considerations of sexual morality, rather than considerations having to do with a child’s quality of
life; accordingly, this challenge is not directly on point here—but it should
weaken any presumptive resistance to some of my claims about HKG because it shows that HKG is not absolute. But the second challenge rested
on an implicit principle that constrains the circumstances in which it is
permissible to bring a child into the world on the basis of quality-of-life
considerations. If the reader shares my reaction to either challenge, then she
is committed to some principle that constrains the circumstances in which
it is legitimate to bring a child into the world. But if the reader shares my
reaction to the second—and more relevant—challenge, then she is committed to a principle, like NLP, that makes quality of life considerations
relevant in determining whether it is permissible to bring a child into the
world. And I suspect any potential principle that rules out bringing a child
into the world on the basis of quality-of-life considerations—and I cannot
ferret out and evaluate all the possibilities in a reply piece—will give me
the result I think I have successfully established with my analysis.
Bawulski offers a second objection to NLP; as he elegantly expresses it,

11

“Do Hell and Exclusivism Make Procreation Morally Impermissible?,” 334.
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The second theological objection, perhaps the stronger, contends that
Himma’s application of NLP to hell is misguided. It rejects a notion inherent in Himma’s argument—that eternal punishment is for innocent victims
who had the misfortune of having existence thrust upon them by their parents. With NLP, the suffering in view comes “as a direct consequence of
being born.” No respectable account of TDH posits reprobation as a direct
result of being born. Being born does not decide the probability or actuality
of one’s eternal destiny: some other factor does. . . . For defenders of TDH
it is sin, not being born, that explains the suffering in hell. Also, for most
defenders of TDH, the suffering in hell is linked to the agent’s liability for
punishment (although the details of this linkage and liability vary).12

Bawulski argues that sinners have eternal suffering as their ultimate fate
as a direct result of their free choices to transgress against God—and not as
a direct result of birth: “Himma assumes that the suffering in eternal punishment is rightly analogous to the suffering and harm from things like
a genetic disease, an environment horribly hostile to human flourishing
with no likelihood of that changing (say, nuclear holocaust), or even the
suffering that most people encounter in this life.”13 That is to say, Bawulski
argues that NLP, if a valid moral principle, would not apply to birth because sin, and not birth, is the direct cause of the agent being consigned to
hell upon death.
As it turns out, my statement of NLP lends itself naturally to such an
interpretation because I used the term “consequence,” expressing NLP in
terms of harms that will result as a consequence of being born. “Consequence” is frequently used to pick out causal results, but I did not intend
to express that idea for two good reasons: (1) it is clear that being born, by
itself, does not cause consignment to hell; and (2) I do not think that NLP is
limited in application to only direct causal results of being born. Indeed, I
scrupulously avoided using the word “cause” to describe the relationship
between being born and being consigned to hell; the only time I used it
was in connection with acts creating risks, a causal claim that is compatible with there being other external factors contributing as well.
Accordingly, a less misleading formulation of NLP—and one that captures only what I intended to capture by it—would be as follows:
NLP: It is morally impermissible to bring a new child into the world
when would-be parents rationally believe there is a sufficiently high
probability that their child would suffer some severe harm after birth
that will endure for as long as she lives.
This principle should be understood as holding that if a significant risk
of severe harm can knowingly be avoided only by abstinence or contraception, two would-be parents would be committing a moral wrong by
conceiving and having a child.
12
13

Ibid., 337.
Ibid.
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Here’s an example to make the idea intuitively plausible. Suppose, for
whatever reason (perhaps God thunders it from the sky), that my wife
and I know that if we conceive a child in the next two weeks, he or she will
be kidnapped shortly after birth and tortured for three weeks and then
killed painfully. It seems clear that we should refrain from conceiving
for that two-week period—even if it means that the particular child who
would have been born is never born because some other child is conceived instead because conception occurs at a later time. The infant’s life
in this case resembles the life of one born with a very painful terminal
illness in all relevant respects. In both cases, the child’s life is short and
untreatably painful.
Another example, if the reader is not convinced, might involve a situation where the probability of getting a highly infectious, painful, terminal
virus is very high. If, for example, two people were spending a year in an
area in which there was an epidemic of a deadly virus, it is clearly permissible for that couple to abstain from conception for as long as they are in
the area. Indeed, I suspect most of us would have some kind of negative
moral reaction to a decision to conceive and give birth to a child in such
a situation—especially if the child would surely die a painful death from
the virus. But it is crucial to note that the child’s becoming infected with
the virus is not the direct causal result of being born; it is the foreseeable result of being contingently brought into other circumstances that
exposed her to the virus. If the reader shares my intuition that it would
be morally problematic to conceive under these circumstances, then she is
committed to something like NLP.
Bawulski would reply that my argument overlooks that hell is a just
consequence of unrepentant sinning. As he puts the point, “Questions
about seemingly undeserved suffering are to be answered in a response to
the problem of evil, not here. Himma’s argument flounders in that it fails
to recognize this important feature of TDH as most defend it: it is just.”14
On this view, then, NLP might sometimes apply to situations involving
a substantial risk of undeserved harm or suffering, but not to a situation
where the harm is deserved, such as occurs when people are justly consigned to hell.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to think that NLP would apply to situations presumably involving deserved suffering. Suppose, for example,
that my wife and I know that any child we conceive within a specified
two-week period will have a set of experiences that will culminate in the
child’s committing acts, starting before he becomes an adult, that lead
him to spend most of his life incarcerated under the worst conditions
consistent with moral principles governing the conditions and terms of
punishment—and these acts need not necessarily involve acts that harm
other people, as there are plenty of laws criminalizing acts that harm only

14

Ibid., 338.

Faith and Philosophy

102

the agent. My intuition is that it would be wrong for us to conceive a child
during that two-week period.
One might think that my response to the case falsely assumes that the
agent is not accountable for these acts, but this is mistaken. The concern
would be that the example assumes that environment and genetics determine certain anti-social traits that condition the performance of anti-social
acts for which the agent cannot be justly held accountable. But this is
incorrect. Everyone assumes that a child’s environment has an effect on
how the child’s character develops. This is why we take seriously the job
of parenting: what we do as parents has a profound effect on what kind
of persons our children become. But we nonetheless assume that persons freely choose when acting on the basis of these character traits that
profoundly influence them in deciding what to do. Although we believe
environment can influence character and even decisions, we do not take
this to imply we lack free will and are hence not accountable for our acts.
Thus, the example and argument above assume nothing inconsistent with
the idea that persons are morally accountable for their acts or with the
idea that sometimes suffering is deserved.
II. Philosophical Objections
Bawulski also offers a number of insightful “philosophical” objections to
my argument that birth is a grave misfortune from the standpoint of the
fetus. My argument is grounded in a strategy for assessing and weighing
certain risks and benefits associated with a person being born into this
world. In particular, I argue that we lack adequate reason to believe that
the probable benefits of being born outweigh the probable costs (i.e., consignment to hell) to justify subjecting a child to that risk by bringing her
into the world.
One way to see the problem is to notice that, assuming an exclusivist
doctrine from any tradition and TDH, simply being born subjects a person
to the most hazardous test imaginable. If one of these traditional exclusivist religions is correct, then a person must choose the right views about
God, religion and ethics, as well as appropriately act on them. The problem
is that none of the arguments for God’s existence or for the unique truth
of some particular religious tradition is so persuasive that a person who
does not accept these arguments is fairly characterized as being epistemically or morally culpable. From a purely prudential standpoint, I would
prefer not to have been born if CSE and TDH are both true without my
having some pretty clearly persuasive reason to think that (1) Christianity
is true; (2) I will come to accept Christianity; and (3) I will do what is really
necessary to be saved according to Christian doctrine. Indeed, I would regard having been born as harmful if any of the exclusivist classical theistic
religions subscribing to TDH is true—and a wrong committed against
me if my parents understood the gravity of the risk to which I was being
subjected. Insofar as my reasoning conforms to standards of practical

SUBJECTING A CHILD TO THE RISK OF ETERNAL TORMENT

103

rationality applicable to all human beings, would-be parents should refrain from bringing children into the world.15
II.A. Does My Analysis Overstate the Probabilities?
The first, and most important, of the objections challenges my evaluation
of the relevant probabilities in deciding whether to bring a child into the
world. As Bawulski puts it:
Himma’s probability assignments are dubitable. . . . In Himma’s scheme,
regarding the birth of a child, globally the probability of the “substantial
harm” of hell is at best 2 in 3, probably higher; in geographic regions where
Christianity is strong, it is perhaps 1 in 2. Yet certainly one can and should consider
more factors, especially localized factors. The background information relevant to
the probability of genuine Christian faith is vastly more extensive than the global or
even regional believer/non-believer ratio: in fact, that ratio is virtually irrelevant.16

Bawulski’s concern here is that my reasoning is grounded in global probabilities that do not apply to committed Christians and hence cannot
support any conclusions about whether it is permissible for committed
Christians to bring new children into the world.
Bawulski argues that my reasoning overstates the probability of consignment to hell for children born to parents who are committed Christians:
What is the probability of reprobation for the potential child of would-be
parents who are deeply committed Christians, actively involved in a thriving local church, who have a stable and functional marriage and home life
as well as a healthy spiritual life, and who fully intend to raise their child in
the way that best encourages and facilitates both assent to the truth of the
core doctrines of Christianity and the lifelong exercising of genuinely saving
faith? . . . I should think that in this type of situation the probability would
be quite low, even if we have uncertainty as to what exactly constitutes genuinely
saving Christian faith.17

There are a number of problems here. To begin, it is not clear, assuming
the truth of other premises in his argument, that consideration of the local
probabilities would justify bringing a child into the world. When catastrophic outcomes are involved in a choice-situation, they are not always
weighed against desirable outcomes in the way costs and benefits are
weighed in more typical decisions involving ordinary harms and benefits.
Consider, for example, a game of Russian Roulette in which the magnitude of what is won or lost is much greater than ordinary harms and
ordinary benefits. The cost of losing is, of course, death—the end of life.
Suppose the prize for winning amounts to all the things you want most
15
These propositions also have important implications for the question of whether abortion should, from the standpoint of Christianity, be legally permitted—even if abortion is
murder. On this question, see Himma, “No Harm, No Foul,” 172–194.
16
“Do Hell and Exclusivism Make Procreation Morally Impermissible?,” 339 (emphasis
mine).
17
Ibid. (emphasis in original).
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for yourself; depending on your values the prizes might include money,
fame, happiness, achievement, etc. My intuition is that, no matter how
good the prize might be, a five-in-six chance of avoiding the catastrophic
outcome of death is not large enough to warrant my playing. Further, I
think that it would be morally wrong to try to persuade another person to
play Russian Roulette under those conditions. If the odds of winning were
5,999,999,999 to 1, then I would play—and might even make some kind
of argument that someone else should play, although I could not do even
that without some moral reservations.18
The problem here is that consignment to eternal torment is as catastrophic an outcome as is possible for any person from the standpoint of
prudential rationality. If I were temporarily given rationality while in the
womb and were informed of the relevant epistemic probabilities of the
potential risks and rewards of being born, I would choose not to be born
even if the chances of eternal bliss are 5 out of 6 and eternal torment just 1
out of 6. While it might be true that eternal bliss is as positive an outcome
as is possible from the standpoint of prudential rationality, I would be no
more willing to play Heavenly Roulette with a 5 in 6 chance of winning
than I would be to play Russian Roulette with those odds—no matter how
desirable the prize is.
The specific probability I chose for the example was not a matter of
happenstance; 5 in 6 odds of winning translate into a .83 probability of
winning or an 83.3 percent chance of winning. In this connection, it is
especially worth noting that a recent study in the sociology of religion
shows that approximately 82 percent of adolescents with religious parents tend to be as active and committed as their parents to the relevant
religious views; in other words, the probability that two Christian parents
raise a child to have—during the period of her adolescence and continuing well
into her twenties—the same beliefs and commitments that a parent has
is about 82 percent.19 But if it is prudentially irrational to choose to play
either game of roulette described above with a .82 probability of winning,
it would be prudentially irrational to choose to be brought into the world
even if one knows—for the purpose of making the decision only—that one
will be born to Christian parents and that there is an 82 percent chance of
winning and for the same reason: the cost of a loss is so catastrophic that
it warrants giving up a significantly greater chance of winning the best
possible prize. And insofar as it is prudentially irrational for a person to
choose birth in this choice-situation, it seems morally wrong to bring that
person into the world (thereby inflicting on him what is irrational for him
18
One runs a bigger risk of death simply by going to work—whether by car, bicycle or
foot. It would, of course, be silly to avoid that risk by staying home because the probable
costs of losing one’s job would vastly exceed the probable benefits of the reduced death risk.
If so, the same reasoning would apply to Russian roulette once the odds of losing became
small enough.
19
See, e.g., Briggs, “Parents No. 1 Influence Helping Teens Remain Religiously Active as
Young Adults.”
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to choose for himself). After all, children are being brought into a difficult
world without their consent.
It might be true that many Christians would not share my precise
intuitions on these cases, but that does not matter. First, I doubt there
is a persuasive argument that my reactions to the two cases above are
prudentially irrational; surely, it is not prudentially irrational to choose
non-existence with no rewards or punishment over an option that has a
theoretically significant probability of producing a catastrophically bad
outcome. Second, it is one thing not to share my strong intuition that nonexistence is the more prudentially rational choice; but it is another entirely
to have a strong intuition that existence is the more prudentially rational
option. This is also an empirical issue, but I would be surprised if many
people had a strong intuition that existence is the better choice here.
Further, Bawulski overestimates the ability of Christian parents to minimize the risk that the children they bring into the world will be consigned
to eternal torment. Bawulski’s view is strikingly optimistic with respect
to the permissibility of Christians bringing new children into the world.
He argues that “legions” of highly devout Christians can justifiably bring
a child into the world because they, “by even a more strict account of salvation requirements, would almost universally be recognized as among
those who ought to be regarded as having genuinely saving Christian
faith.”20 Such highly devout Christians are justified in bringing a child into
the world, on this reasoning, because they would impart to their child the
“even more strict account of salvation,” ensuring that they, too, “would . . .
be recognized as among those who ought to be regarded as having genuinely saving Christian faith.” At bottom, the argument here is that devout
Christians can circumvent what epistemic uncertainty there is about what
is needed for salvation by adopting—and imparting to their children—a
sufficiently strict account of the requirements for being spared an eternity
of torments.
To begin, it is worth noting that this is an argument that will work only
on the assumption that Christianity is the correct religion. In the absence
of that assumption, there is no reason whatsoever to think that legions of
Christians can feel confident that they will produce children who will be
saved; if exclusivist Islam is true, those children will be consigned to hell.
Of course, one of the features of the world that makes birth so hazardous
is that we lack persuasive reason to think either that an all-perfect God
exists or that Christianity (or any religion) is uniquely true—which means
that Bawulski’s argument is very limited with respect to what work it can
do, if any.
In addition, what a sufficiently “strict” account of salvation would require as a prerequisite for salvation is not clear. Loving Jesus is clearly a
prerequisite for salvation on any mainstream view, but Jesus is clear that
keeping his commandments is part of what it takes to “love” Jesus (John
20
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14:15)—and one of his commandments is, of course, the command to
love one’s neighbor as one loves oneself. Although it is not clear how this
commandment is correctly interpreted, one might interpret it, as a means
of teaching a more strict account of salvation, as requiring much greater
sacrifices than most traditional Christians believe is necessary or even
doable. One reason to think it is easier for a camel to pass through a needle
than for a rich man to enter heaven is that the rich man has discretionary
income that was not used to relieve suffering to the extent required by
the command to love one’s neighbor as one loves oneself. If so, teaching a
more strict account of salvation—and the danger here is especially tragic if
it is not the correct account—could actually discourage faith by demoralizing the child to whom this is taught. There are, thus, two problems with
Bawulski’s argument that Christians who satisfy a more strict account of
salvation and hence have genuine saving Christian faith could lower the
probability of a child’s being consigned to hell by teaching her that account of salvation: (1) we do not really have any idea of what a sufficiently
strict account of salvation might require; and (2) teaching an account that
is stricter than the correct account of salvation might make it less likely
that she accept Christianity if it seems implausibly or demoralizingly
strict to her.
II.B. Counterexamples to NLP?
Bawulski argues, further, that NLP cuts too broadly, prohibiting procreation in situations in which it is intuitively permissible, and offers what he
takes to be counterexamples to NLP:
Consider cases of potential parents in areas of the world where war, starvation, disease, etc. are prevalent, or any situation where there is a high epistemic probability of a child suffering in this life. NLP would seemingly rule
out procreation in these cases (again, apart from TDH, exclusivism, or any
consideration beyond just this life). On Himma’s account, procreation would
be morally impermissible for poor married couples, for anyone living in impoverished communities, and even for some entire nations (indeed, as noted
above, Himma says as much). I suspect many would share my discomfort
with this implication.21

The claim here seems to be that NLP rules out procreation in cases where,
according to ordinary intuitions (Bawulksi talks in terms of “discomfort”),
it is permissible.
Assuming that Bawulski is correct in suggesting that NLP should not
apply in such cases to prohibit procreation, the problem he points to can
be avoided simply by reformulating the notion of “severe harm” in NLP
so that it does not apply to such cases. One plausible way to do this is to
define the harm that triggers application of NLP as one no practically rational person would be willing to risk for herself. The torments of hell are
so severe that one has to question the rationality of someone who would
21
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willingly do something that she believes incurs a substantial risk—one that
cannot be counterbalanced by some good the act produces—of the kind
of suffering involved in eternal torment. It is one thing for a person not
to believe that hell exists as a punishment or to have significant doubts
about its existence. It is another thing entirely for that person to believe
that hell exists as a divine punishment but not deploy that belief to constrain what she does in this world; someone who simply does not care
at all whether hell exists or whether she might go there is practically irrational. This is not true of any of the examples that Bawulksi cites in his
counterargument above.
Nevertheless, it is not as clear as Bawulski believes that NLP should not
apply to these cases. Do we really think it is not morally wrong to bring a
child into the middle of a war zone when the parents have no reason to
think the war will come to a timely end and have good reason to think
that the child might be killed or maimed for life? Do we really think it is
not morally wrong for people who cannot feed their children because they
live in absolute poverty to bring a child into the world when that child
faces a high probability of a painful death from malnutrition? One can
certainly bite the bullet and take that position for theoretical purposes,
but that accomplishes nothing. If one really believes, as I do intuitively,
that it is wrong to bring a child into the world under those circumstances, then one is really committed, assuming the rest of the argument
holds up to scrutiny, to rejecting either TDH or Christian exclusivism—
both of which, as far as I am concerned, paint God as arbitrary, cruel,
and barbaric.22
Conclusions
I do not believe, and have not argued, that it is morally wrong, as a general
matter, for anyone to bring children in the world—unless we are in danger
of overpopulation or the mother is young and cannot provide for the child
or the child has a substantial risk of some severe disease or disability.
But I have argued that the conjunction of NLP, CSE, and TDH entail it is
morally wrong for anyone to have children—and that either CSE or TDH
should be rejected. Of course, one can always bite the bullet and give up
the ordinary moral intuitions that I think are expressed by NLP; however,
the more reasonable response is to give up one of the other views, which
cause so many philosophical problems that they seem far less reliable than

22
Bawulski believes that my argument presupposes that consequentialism is true (“Do
Hell and Exclusivism Make Procreation Morally Impermissible?,” 342). It is true that I weigh
costs and benefits, but that is not inconsistent with NLP being grounded in a deontological
moral theory. It might help to note here that NLP does not say it is wrong to bring a child into
the world if it does not maximize utility; it says it is wrong to bring a child into the world if
the disutilities reach a very high threshold. That is not consistent with act-utilitarianism; and
it is no more consistent with a rule-utilitarian theory (which strikes me as not really being
consequentialist in character) than with a deontological theory.
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the intuitions expressed in NLP. But I cannot even begin to defend that
point here.23
University of Washington School of Law
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